The One and Done Dilemma

Intro: My Battle with Article X

One key rule change that I have argued with my family and friends about over the past couple of years is Article X of the NBA’s 2005 collective bargaining agreement which requires basketball players to be at least 19 years old and one year removed from high school before making the leap to the majors. After hours and hours of verbal sparring with my dad (who remembers the days when great NBA players started with surreal college careers with even more unbelievable matchups between future hall of famers and rivals), I came to the conclusion that the best thing for all of basketball is to edit Article X to allow high school players to make the jump directly to the NBA or have them spend at least two years in college before being allowed to leave. With this change, NBA executives would be forced to trust their analytics teams in order to make the right selections if they were to choose a high school player, and would have a chance to mold them into their system immediately.

One of the major reasons for Article X was that teams either found superstars in their high school picks or selected players that weren’t as ready as they thought they were. Because of this current new wave of analytics and statistical evaluations, teams are better prepared when researching prospects and are able to select the best players possible, eliminating a majority of the concerns about teams’ abilities to predict a player’s growth in the league. Busts are a part of the game, as we’ve seen in Hasheem Thabeet, Kwame Brown, and Greg Oden (to name a few), and it isn’t the league’s job to prevent each team’s missteps, it is up to the executives and scouts to do their job well and avoid conflict.

As for the high school players, they now get a choice to jump right into the NBA if they feel like they can handle it, or take two years to refine their skills. If they choose to go to the NBA then it is up to them to adapt and grow. If they crash and burn, they knew the risks of going to the NBA while lacking the proper gateway that is necessary to ease into the pro-systems. If they choose to go to college, they get an education, get to work on their basketball IQs, and get to participate in more competitive college games. Imagine a Kentucky team with John Wall, DeMarcus Cousins, and Eric Bledsoe (to name three of the eleven one-and-done players from UK). Overall, the one-and-done system produces a lot of upsets in college basketball (which can be entertaining) but also creates a lack of familiarity for fans. We remember Draymond Green, JJ Redick, and Tyler Hansbrough as the phenomenal college players that we saw regularly and enjoyed knowing about as great players. With one-and-dones, we get uncertainty. Josh Selby, the #5 player in the country according to ESPN coming out of high school, averaged 32 points, 7 assists, 5 rebounds, and 2 steals a game as a senior in high school. In college, he never got settled in and struggled, putting up 7.9 points a game before leaving for the NBA Draft. He was viewed as a can’t miss NBA star: an improved Chris Paul or Dwayne Wade. His career NBA averages are 2.2 points, 0.9 assists, and 0.5 rebounds per game. He could have benefited from another year in the NCAA.

Another huge argument in college sports is whether or not students should be paid to play. This discussion usually is focused on college football, but every year I notice at least 5-10 players on Top 25 contending teams that face accusations of accepting illegal benefits for playing at their school. I believe that, through editing Article X, the argument for paying students involved with NCAAB teams will be ended. Players who feel the need to get money fast can risk their future NBA outlook in the murky waters of the NBA draft right out of high school if they are that desperate. Other players, who recognize that they are in need of some maturation and fundamental development, can choose to accept the generous scholarship money already offered to them in order to play and get an education for at least 2 years while they hone their skills.

Now, I always attempt to back up my theories with (what I consider to be meaningful) stats, so here are the ones I’ve gathered over the past two weeks. I chose to first compare the last 3 drafts (2010-2012) to the drafts that happened 10 years before (2000-2002), and the success rate of the picks considering how long they’ve lasted in the league:

2010-2012:

10 freshmen drafted in 2010 (2 out of the league (Hassan Whiteside in China and Tiny Gallon in Puerto Rico) and 2 in D league (Daniel Orton (2 NBA teams) and Xavier Henry (3 NBA teams)) (5 starters: J. Wall, D. Cousins, E. Bledsoe, A. Bradley, L. Stephenson) (1 role player: Derrick Favors (probably will start next year)

Success rate of 2010: 6/10 = .6 (5/10 = .5 for starters)

7 in 2011 (5 starters: K. Irving, E. Kanter, T. Thompson, B. Knight, Tobias Harris) (1 role player: cory joseph for the spurs) (1 D-League: Josh Selby: #1 by Rivals, #5 by ESPN going into college)

Success Rate of 2011: 6/7 = .86 (5/7 = .71 for starters)

8 players drafted in 2012 draft were freshmen (2 in D-League: Tony Wroten for the Grizzlies/Sixers and Quincy Miller for the Nuggets) (5 starters: M. Harkless, A. Davis, M. Kidd-Gilchrist, B. Beal, A. Drummond) (2 bench: A. Rivers, M. Teague)

Success rate of 2012: 6/8 = .75 (5/8 = .625 for starters)

2000-2002:

HSSR = High School Senior

FR= Freshmen

2000: HSSR: Darius Miles, DeShawn Stevenson

                FR: DerMarr Johnson, Jamal Crawford (Michigan), Donnell Harvey (Florida)

Success Rate: 2/5 = .4 (starters = .2)

2001: HSSR: Kwame Brown, Tyson Chandler, Eddy Curry, Sagana Diop, Ousmane Cisse, 

              FR: Eddie Griffin, Rodney White, Zach Randolph, Gerald Walace, Omar Cook, Alton Ford

Success Rate: 5/11 = .45

2002: Jamal Sampson, Amare Stoudemire (only HSSR), Dajuan Wagner.

Success Rate: 1/3 = .33

What these stats mean:

            Over the past 13 years, the success rate has shown a dramatic increase, which surprised me slightly. The average success rate of players in the NBA from ’00-’02 was only 42% (8/19), while the average success rate from ’10-’12 is 72% (18/25). That is an increased rate of success of 30%. I was not too surprised because the extra year before the NBA allows players to get acclimated to a high caliber college system before making the jump to the more complex schemes of the NBA. I decided I wasn’t content with just this pool of data, however, because I felt it didn’t grasp the largest possible sample size of players since Article X. If I only looked at players who had been in the league for 1-3 years, there is clearly a greater chance that they would remain in the NBA (unless they collapsed completely after the switch to the NBA). Disgruntled by my research, or lack thereof, I decided to look at the success rate of every draft since Article X (’06-’09), and found this:

2006-2009:

2006: Tyrus Thomas, Shawne Williams

Success rate: .5

2007: Greg Oden, Kevin Durant, Mike Conley, Brandan Wright, Spencer Hawes, Thaddeus Young, Javaris Crittenton, Daequan Cook

Success rate: 7/8 = .875

2008: Derrick Rose, Michael Beasley, OJ Mayo, Kevin Love, Eric Gordon, Jerryd Bayless, Anthony Randolph, JJ Hickson, Kosta Koufos, Donte Greene, DeAndre Jordan, Bill Walker

Success rate: 10/12 = .83

2009: Tyreke Evans, DeMar DeRozan, Jrue Holiday, BJ Mullens

Success rate: 4/4 = 1.0

Analysis:

When I pool these four draft results with those from ’10-’12, I found the total success rate to be 40/51, or 78%, which is even better than I imagined.  This high percentage (which is 36% higher than the rate from ’00-’02), only improves the argument for players to attend college. What I believe, however, is that it still should be the player’s choice. As 18-19 year olds, we are given the responsibility to pursue a field/profession in college or through other paths in life, and if athletes believe that their true path is going directly to the NBA, why is it the league’s job to stop them. Players like Kendrick Perkins don’t necessarily need college to develop and would find it more beneficial to learn behind current NBA players. If players want to take that chance, I say why stop them. They know what they are getting themselves into. As for all the other players who decide to go to school, they get at least two years out of the spotlight that many of them can’t handle, and they get to mature and develop with better competition at the college level.

Because I love stats, I gathered even more, just to prove that NBA teams feel more comfortable drafting younger players after one year of college, this time using the original samples from ’00-’02 and ’10-‘12:

Players Drafted by Round:

1st round:

'00-'02: 5  + 8  + 2  = 15 total (7 of which were HSSR)

'10-'12: 7 + 6 + 8 = 21

2nd round:

'00-'02: 0 + 3  + 1  = 4 total (1 of which was a HSSR)

'10='12: 3 + 1 + 1 = 5

More Analysis:

21 one and dones in 3 years went in the first round. That is an increase of 40% from ’00-’02 (21/15 =1.4). This increase shows that the team executives in the NBA feel that the college freshmen are capable enough to play in the NBA after one year in advanced systems.

My Conclusion:

I firmly believe that, through editing Article X, NBA teams would benefit either from the ability to draft high school players in an attempt mold them into their personal system or from the ability to gather more data from a larger sample college sample size during each players’ extra year (in order to predict potential growth).  The NCAA would benefit because of the marketability of the super-teams of outstanding, raw young athletes that would form each year, along with the drop in illegal student benefit scandals that often take out a few top recruits each year. Additionally, I enjoy watching players develop in college because of the feeling of intimacy you have as a fan when you see the same face on your favorite team each season, whether it be Corey Raji, Jon Leuer, or Aaron Craft. In conclusion, Article X creates a lack of knowledge for the average basketball fans every year, who lack the time or patience to research new prospects, take away a valuable year for the gifted prospects that ARE actually capable of making the jump, and not to mention makes March Madness brackets more and more difficult.

The Quick Comparison: Danny Amendola vs. Wes Welker

First Three Seasons (of at least 10 starts):

Player A:

48 games: 208 receptions, 2296 yards, 9 touchdowns, 11.04 yards per reception, 47.8 yards a game

Player B:

41 games, 191 receptions, 1681 yards, 7 touchdowns, 8.8 yards per reception, 41.0 yards a game

As some of you may have guessed, Player A is Wes Welker and Player B is Danny Amendola. While Amendola is slightly larger (5-9 vs. 5-11) and is viewed as a more athletic Welker, Wes has been an ironman for the Patriots since he joined the team in 2007, missing only 3 games during his 6 seasons with the Patriots.  Amendola is a larger injury risk, having missed 22 games over his first 4 seasons in the NFL.  Additionally, while Sam Bradford isn’t the dream quarterback for any wide receiver, he is much better than both Gus Frerotte and Joey Harrington (the two leading Dolphins quarterbacks during Welker’s time in Miami). Welker went from averaging 35.03 yards a game to 73.43 yards a game after joining the Patriots. Welker’s per game production more than doubled despite adjusting to his new system. Also, Wes Welker was more capable at breaking off big plays because of his elusiveness and speed, giving him the advantage on catches of 20+ and 40+ yards (25 and 3 respectively compared to 8 and 2). Finally, while Amendola’s size may seem like an advantage when going for a first down, Welker was actually more effective when going for the first (118 to 93).

What worries me most about Amendola is his inability to produce as the leading receiver on a team. As the #1 in St. Louis, he was targeted 101 times while making only 63 catches (Welker had 67 catches with 99 targets in his final year with the Dolphins). In addition, Amendola also displayed stagnant production in the second half, especially lacking the big play potential that the Rams desperately needed when they were down:

Amendola (2012):

1^st  half: 352 yards on 33 catches (10.66 yards per reception)

2^nd half: 299 on 28 (10.69)

64% of his receptions became first down in the second half

1 play of 40+ yards in the fourth quarter

Welker (2006):

357 yards on 33 catches (10.81 yards per reception)

330 yards on 34 catches (9.7) (including 24 catches in the 4^th quarter)

53% of his receptions became first downs in the second half

4 plays of 20+ yards in the 4^th quarter

Overall, while I’m am hopeful that Amendola can fulfill his potential as a bigger slot receiver for the Patriots, my expectations are lower than Welker’s seasonal stats. I would’ve, like most Patriots fans, preferred to see the Brady-to-Welker connection again this season based on the 5 seasons of 100+ catches and the clear chemistry between the two players, but I have to believe that Danny Amendola, if healthy, will be able to come close to Welker’s productions, give or take 20 catches and 300 yards.